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Abstract 
Using input-output models, we analyze the effect of removing subsidized 
oil products in Morocco. We set three scenarios of increasing oil products by 
25%, 50% and 75%, and symmetric decreases by the same amounts. We show 
that the effects are high in intensive oil products sectors such as transports and 
electricity and water sectors. Using the weights of the sectors, we deduce the 
overall inflation generated by direct and indirect requirements for the total 
economy. For example, an increase in oil prices by 75% generates a global 
inflation cost between 5.5% and 8%. Symmetric scenarios indicate no strong 
asymmetrical effects. The generated inflation may alter the stable path of inflation 
recorded over the past fifteen years putting pressure on the monetary authorities. 
Therefore, the change of strategy from managed exchange rate regime towards a 
flexible regime, extensively discussed, is now an urgent necessity. 
JEL Codes: D57, E31, Q41 
Keywords: Energy Reform, Fiscal Policy, Inflation, Input-Output Models, 
Asymmetric Effects, Morocco. 
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1. Introduction 
Reforming subsidies constitutes a real challenging task for the 
Governments regarding their economic, social and political implications. 
Economically, removing subsidies of imported products means increasing the cost 
of intermediary inputs consumption for producers and increasing the prices of the 
final goods for households’ consumption. This also means deteriorating the 
competitive advantage for domestic exporting firms from the producers' 
perspective. Socially, this has direct negative consequences on the households as 
it may erode their purchasing power and increases poverty and inequalities if such 
reforms have not been accompanied by policies mitigating these effects. Indeed, a 
recent study of the World Bank simulated that removing subsidies in Morocco, 
increases poverty by 4.4 percentage points, for an equivalent poverty line of US$ 
1.44 per day, and the Gini inequality index by 2.1 percentage points (Verme et al., 
2014). Politically, lobbies against removing subsidies, represented by political 
opposition parties and associations, are motivated by personal and group interests 
and play an aggressive role against any attempt of reforming subsidies. The 
presence of a strong government coalition and consensus building at the time of 
reform is a prerequisite condition for its success (Sdralevich et al., 2014). 
The continuing increase of the cost of subsidized imported products in 
recent years due to soaring energy and food prices had push a big pressure on the 
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Government to urge reforming such subsidies. The bill of subsidies has 
continuously increased from 1.3% as percent of GDP in 2002, to 8.1% of GDP in 
2012. The important share is for petroleum products subsidy with DH48.2 billion 
(US$5.8 billion) representing 7% of GDP in 2012. At the same time, the share of 
imported oil products increases from 0.4% in 1998 to 10.6% in 2012. 
Consequently, budget deficit including subsidies moved from -2.2% in 2009 to -
7.3% in 2012. Without subsidies, this deficit is only about -0.4% in 2009 and 
reaches 0.7% in 2012. The current account deficit stood at high records in 2012, 
with -9.7%. Consequently, international reserves are reduced to less than three 
months of imports and the debt ratio increased as the country resort to external 
financing. With regards to these high weights of petroleum products and the 
instability of oil prices, the reform of such subsidies becomes an urgent necessity 
for the Government. 
The motivation of removing prices subsidies is not only driven by the high 
burden cost that weighs on the Government budget, it is also argued that such 
system of subsidies does not benefit to the poor compared to the rich population. 
In fact, many studies have shown that subsidies are pro-rich; approximately, the 
first quintile of the rich people benefits from the largest part of the total subsidies 
(Verme et al., 2014). For example, the poorest quintile benefits from diesel 
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subsidies by only 1/6 the amount of the benefit of the richest quintile (7% for the 
poor versus 42% for the rich) (Sdralevich et al., 2014). 
Recently, Morocco adopted a gradual approach as to the removal of 
subsidies especially petroleum products subsidies. Starting by the energy bill, a 
system of domestic prices indexation to international oil price was introduced in 
July 2013. In January 2014, the Government succeeded to remove the total 
subsidy for the "gasoline" product, followed by the removal of the total subsidy 
over the "diesel" product in January 2015. The subsidies of other oil products 
such as the industrial fuel have also been reduced but still not totally removed. 
This constitutes an important gain contributing to the decline of the budget deficit 
from -7.3% in 2012 to around -5.4% in 2014.  
The total removal subsidy of gasoline and diesel has coincided with a 
downward of oil prices starting on September 2014. This has to avoid the 
inflationary pressures that may arise due to the removal of subsidies. 
Nevertheless, the assessment of such pressures due to the increase of the cost of 
production should warn policy makers from the adverse effects of inflation 
generated by large swings of international oil prices. The recent history of 
inflation evolution in Morocco has shown very low stable prices around 1.73% as 
an average over the period of 1998-2013, that we could qualify by a great 
moderation inflation era in the country. It is the lowest inflation rate amongst the 
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MENA region whether this is due to the central bank successful policy in 
controlling domestic prices or other factors
1
. We use an input-output framework 
to analyze the pass-through effects of international oil prices to domestic prices as 
a result of removing subsidies in a small open oil-importing developing economy 
such as Morocco. This paper constitutes an added value to the so limited 
empirical literature focusing on the inflationary pressures as a consequence of 
subsidy reform in a net oil importing country in the MENA region.  
In what follows, we present a brief literature review of the effects of 
subsidies on prices and welfare. The third section describes the Input-Output 
models methodology used to assess the effect of the removal of subsidies on 
prices for 20 producing sectors and the overall inflation in Morocco. Data, facts 
and figures about the important weight of such subsidies are shown in the fourth 
section. The fifth section draws results and comments, while the sixth one 
discusses possible policy actions and concludes. 
2. Literature review on the economy of subsidies: impacts on prices  
The role of subsidies in the economy is fuzzy. From different views of 
many economists, subsidy system could disrupt producers’ prices. The subsequent 
                                                            
1 For details about this issue, an analysis is briefed in the “conclusion and policy discussion” 
section. 
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section discusses the effects of subsidies and their removal on prices for a 
relatively small, open and net energy importing country such as Morocco.   
The literature developments about subsidies effects are relatively minor. 
The major empirical studies and reports about subsidies are those of the IMF and 
the World Bank institutions. Canceling subsidies for an oil importing country 
means exposing local producers and consumers to prices inflation of goods and 
services generated by international oil price increases. The impact of energy 
prices swings are studied by many economists. For example, Hanson et al. (1993) 
analyses the effects of international oil prices shocks on the agricultural sector 
using input output models and general equilibrium models. On the same way, 
Coady et al. (2006) and Del Granado et al. (2010) use models based on input-
output tables to assess the real income losses associated with reducing subsidies 
on fuel products.  To assess the macroeconomic long run effects of subsidized 
energy products for a small, oil-importing developing country, Plante (2014) 
calibrated a general equilibrium model. The main conclusions are that, in the long 
run, the presence of subsidies increases the supply of hours worked and real 
wages leading to an over emphasis on traded goods while distorting the relative 
price of non-traded goods. By contrast, a general equilibrium simulation for Egypt 
(the World Bank, 2014) shows that energy subsidies shift resources from labor 
intensive resources to capital intensive resources leading to higher unemployment. 
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Thus reducing subsidies should lead to higher labor and or wages especially in 
labor intensive sectors promoting the overall employment. 
A lot of studies and reports confirm the negative role of the subsidies 
directly on the budget and the current account balance, threatening the 
sustainability of the public finances. Their presence also creates distortions on the 
economy and could increase inequalities. The positive sides of the subsidies are 
assumed to benefit to final consumers through lowering prices of energy and food 
and to producers by reducing the cost of intermediate inputs. As a result, subsidies 
cushion the effects of imported inflation and the additional subsequent inflation 
generated by the cost of the imported inputs. However, untargeted subsidies have 
tendency to favor a group of rich consumers over the poor missing the goal of 
protecting vulnerable people. About 1% in Egypt and Mauritania and less than 
3% in Sudan (Sdralevich et al., 2014), and about 0.86% of diesel and gasoline in 
Morocco (Verme et al., 2014) are the shares of petroleum products subsidies 
consumed by the poorest 20% of the population. These figures show that energy 
subsidies do not benefit to the poor.  
Despite the fact that energy subsidies are pro-rich, the adverse effects, in 
the short term, of their removal could be highly felt by the vulnerable population 
and the medium classes. The adverse effects are the inflationary pressures as a 
consequence on the other sectors intensives in energy inputs. The concerned 
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sectors are generally those intensive in petroleum products inputs such as 
transport, electricity and water production and food processing and manufacturing 
industries. The short run effects could be extended to medium and long term 
effects via spiral prices and wages and due to subsequent higher expectations of 
future inflation. Furthermore, exporting sectors could see their foreign 
competitiveness threatened due to an increase in the production costs as a 
consequence of the removal of subsidies. This is why reforming subsidies is 
advisable to be gradual and accompanied by policies cushioning such negative 
externalities. Furthermore, removing subsidies could increase energy smuggling 
across neighboring countries due to huge price differences between these 
countries (El-Katiri and Fattouh, 2015). 
3. Input-Output price models methodology 
The input-output models are granted to the Russian Nobel Prize, Wassily 
Leontief. Each economy is disaggregated to a number of sectors n. In order to 
produce, each of the n sectors uses some or all different commodities produced by 
the other sectors as inputs including its proper commodity. The amounts of each 
product used in the production of one unit of each sector are represented by a 
)( nn  matrix nnijaA )( , commonly called the technological matrix or technical 
coefficients of the entire economy. So, for a fixed i  and j , 
ija  is the amount of 
input i  required to produce one unit of the good j . 
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Using the input output tables of a country, several simple formulae are 
developed to answer important questions such as; calculating inputs required for a 
given vector of final demands or, calculating final production for given available 
inputs or also assessing the impacts of an input or several inputs prices changes 
over the other inputs prices. The latter is known as the price input-output model. 
Noting 1)(nX   a vector of total produced output by the n sectors of the 
economy and )1(nD  the vector of final demand, leads to: 
DX-AX    (1) 
Where AX is the part of the production served as input (intermediary 
consumption) and the left hand side is then, net production. Assuming that (I-A)  
is a nonsingular matrix, the production vector is deducted as: 
D(I-A)X -1   (2) 
For the price input-output model, we follow (Hanson et al., 1993). The 
derivation of change in unit costs, to measure direct and indirect cost linkages in 
an input-output model starts from the definition of cost prices: 
 VWA'PP    (3) 
Where, P  is an n-element vector of sector prices, V is an n-element vector 
of value-added coefficients, W is an n-element vector of value added prices and 
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A is a transpose of the technological matrix A . Each sector output unit is 
allocated to purchase the intermediate inputs from other economic sectors ( A'P ) 
and the primary factors (VW ) (wages). 
Deriving the equation according to the price P yields: 
  VdWA'dPdP    (4) 
Rearranging the equation above yields: 
VdW (I - A')dP -1   (5) 
In assessing the impact of price changes of sectors over other economic 
sectors, the nature of the impact differs whether the price of the studied sectors 
should be treated as exogenous or endogenous. For example, for many 
commodities, such as oil products, prices are internationally determined and are 
treated as exogenous for importing countries.  
In practice, treating the k  sectors, experiencing the price shock as 
exogenous, in the first step, is eliminating the k sectors from the structure of the 
production by removing their corresponding rows and columns from the 
technological matrix A. the second step is to include the removed rows of the 
direct requirements of the k exogenous sectors in the value added vector V. This 
allows the estimation of the effect of the prices shocks on cost prices of other 
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sectors (or sectors' prices if all the higher costs are passed on to buyers). The 
reduced technological matrix is of dimension )( kn  by )( kn  and V is now a 
)( kn  by )1( k matrix. Assessment of the exogenous price shocks effects is 
deduced by applying the precedent formula (5) to the new matrices. 
4. Data and subsidy burden in the economy 
We possess input-output matrices for the Moroccan economy for each 
year over the period 1998-2013, from the website of the High Commission for 
Planning in Morocco2. The data matrices are disaggregated on 20 producing 
sectors. The definitions and codes of these sectors are presented along with the 
weight of each sector in table 1. The weight for each sector is defined as its total 
use of all products inputs to the all inputs used by the economy to produce the 
whole output. Table 1 presents also the refined oil and other related products 
intensiveness of the 20 sectors of the Moroccan economy. We present data for 
three input-output tables of selected years where oil prices are low (1998), 
medium (2005) and high (2012). The intensiveness in oil products, for each 
sector, is defined as the intermediary consumption of refined oil divided by the 
total inputs used by that sector in the process of production. 
                                                            
2 http://www.hcp.ma/downloads/Comptabilite-nationale_t11873.html 
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The most intensive oil sectors are fishing and aquaculture, transports, 
electricity and water, mining industries, other manufacturing industries and trade 
and repairing. Taking the weights into accounts, which are varying between the 
three years, the most consuming sectors in refined oil products are transportation 
and trade and repairing sectors in 2012. 
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Table 1: Oil intensiveness, sectors' weights and weighted intensity in percent (%)  
 
  
1998 2005 2012 
 
  
Oil 
intensityi 
Sectors' 
weightii 
Weighted 
intensityiii 
Oil 
intensityi 
Sectors' 
weightii 
Weighted 
intensityiii 
Oil 
intensityi 
Sectors' 
weightii 
Weighted 
intensityiii Rank Code Economic sectors 
1 A00 Agriculture, hunting, & related services 4.4 18.5 0.8 7.7 14.9 1.1 8.2 9.8 0.8 
2 B05 Fishing and aquaculture 35.0 0.8 0.3 47.9 0.9 0.4 49.1 0.8 0.4 
3 C00 Mining Industry 19.0 5.5 1.0 31.4 9.0 2.8 31.7 3.5 1.1 
4 D01 Food Industry and Tobacco 1.5 7.4 0.1 2.8 6.4 0.2 3.0 9.7 0.3 
5 D02 Textile industry and cook 1.2 7.9 0.1 2.3 6.0 0.1 2.9 3.7 0.1 
6 D03 Chemical industry and para 1.8 7.2 0.1 3.6 5.9 0.2 3.2 3.7 0.1 
7 D04 Mechanical, electric & metal industries 1.4 12.8 0.2 2.7 13.6 0.4 2.8 5.3 0.2 
8 D05 Other manufacturing industries 10.1 11.1 1.1 18.0 10.2 1.8 20.3 3.7 0.7 
9 D06 Oil refining and others 0.1 5.4 0.0 0.0 8.2 0.0 0.1 4.0 0.0 
10 E00 Electricity and water 30.4 3.6 1.1 24.6 3.2 0.8 24.0 2.3 0.6 
11 F45 Building and public works 4.4 0.2 0.0 5.9 0.3 0.0 6.9 9.0 0.6 
12 G00 Trade and repairing 10.9 0.9 0.1 17.2 0.9 0.2 18.8 8.1 1.5 
13 H55 Hotels and restaurants 1.1 0.6 0.0 2.1 0.9 0.0 2.2 2.3 0.1 
14 I01 Transportation 29.2 1.9 0.6 38.7 2.2 0.8 43.7 4.7 2.1 
15 I02 Post and telecommunications 3.6 1.3 0.0 5.1 1.1 0.1 5.8 2.4 0.1 
16 J00 Financial activities and insurance 0.0 7.6 0.0 0.0 8.1 0.0 0.0 4.5 0.0 
17 K00 Real estate, rental & services to enterprise 3.1 6.5 0.2 5.8 7.5 0.4 5.3 7.7 0.4 
18 L75 General public administration & security 14.6 0.0 0.0 12.7 0.0 0.0 13.3 7.6 1.0 
19 MNO Education, health and social work 3.4 0.1 0.0 4.0 0.1 0.0 4.5 6.2 0.3 
20 OP0 Other non financial services 2.9 0.5 0.0 6.4 0.5 0.0 7.4 0.9 0.1 
 
 
Total 
 
100.0 5.8 
 
100.0 9.5 
 
100.0 10.4 
Source: Author’s calculation from the input-output tables for the Moroccan Economy for the years 1998, 2005 and 2012. 
i: The oil intensity or intensiveness is the quantity of refined oil used as input among other inputs.   
ii: The weight for each sector is defined as its total use of all products inputs to the all inputs used by the economy to produce the whole output. 
Following the same notations in section 3, we formulate the weight iW for each sector i as:    






n
1i
n
1j
ij
A
n
1j
ij
AWi . 
iii: weighted intensity is the oil intensiveness taking into account the weight of the sector in the economy in terms of using inputs. It is the 
results of the oil intensity multiplied by the weight: iWiOIiWI   
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Table 2 summarizes some interesting facts about the food and energy 
subsidies trends in Morocco as well as the associated imports of energy products 
and oil prices. The evolution of shares is reversed, by time, between the two 
principal categories of subsidized products; food versus energy products. Food 
subsidy which was about 90% of total subsidies in 1998 decreased to around 13% 
in 2012 and 15% in 2013. Their level grows by only 1.2% on geometrical average 
over the past fifteen years while the total subsidy grows by 17% over 1998-2012. 
This huge growth is dragged by the energy subsidy that grows at an annual 
geometric rate of 38% following a high recorded oil prices especially in 2011, 
2012 and 2013. The oil imports have considerably increased as a share of GDP 
from 0.6% in 1998 to 7.4% in 2012 following a sustained increasing trend in oil 
prices over this period. The important increasing of the bill energy compared to 
the food and the sensitivity of vulnerable population to the food subsidy are the 
principal reasons behind starting with reforming energy subsidies first.  
The planning of removing such subsidies has started in July 2013 allowing 
reducing the peak of energy subsidies recorded in 2012 by a saved amount of 
nearly DH13 billion ( about US$1.6 billion) or the equivalent of 2.1 percentage 
points of GDP. The 2014 is expected to reduce the energy subsidies by more 
while in 2015, more than 80% of energy subsidies are expected to be waived. This 
amount is the share on the total energy products of the gasoline and diesel been 
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totally unsubsidized starting from January 2015 and other fuel products partially 
unsubsidized.
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Table 2: Evolution of subsidies in levels and shares of main economic aggregates 
 Total subsidies 
Food products 
subsidies 
Energy products 
subsidies 
Oil 
imports 
Oil 
Prices 
(Brent, 
Europe) 
years 
Million 
of Dh 
% of 
GDP 
% of 
Imports 
% of public 
consumption 
Million 
of Dh 
% 
of 
total 
% of 
GDP 
Million 
of Dh 
% of 
total 
% of 
GDP 
% of 
GDP 
U.S. $ 
per 
barrel 
1998 5,835 1.5 5.4 9.1 5,306 90.9 1.4 529 9.1 0.1 0.6 12.8 
1999 6,376 1.6 5.5 9.1 5,456 85.6 1.4 920 14.4 0.2 0.7 17.9 
2000 7,995 2.0 6.1 11.1 5,506 68.9 1.4 2,489 31.1 0.6 1.3 28.7 
2001 6,377 1.5 4.7 8.0 3,767 59.1 0.9 2,610 40.9 0.6 1.3 24.5 
2002 5,665 1.3 3.9 7.0 3,593 63.4 0.8 2,072 36.6 0.5 1.3 25.0 
2003 6,347 1.3 4.2 7.3 3,977 62.7 0.8 2,370 37.3 0.5 2.3 28.9 
2004 8,329 1.6 4.8 8.8 3,742 44.9 0.7 4,587 55.1 0.9 1.9 38.3 
2005 11,269 2.1 5.6 11.0 3,806 33.8 0.7 7,463 66.2 1.4 2.4 54.6 
2006 13,143 2.3 5.7 12.3 5,443 41.4 0.9 7,700 58.6 1.3 2.9 65.2 
2007 16,150 2.6 5.8 14.4 5,469 33.9 0.9 10,681 66.1 1.7 3.6 72.4 
2008 16,150 2.8 4.6 13.7 5,469 33.9 0.9 10,681 66.1 1.8 4.8 96.9 
2009 12,788 2.1 4.4 9.6 3,488 27.3 0.6 9,300 72.7 1.5 3.9 61.7 
2010 30,198 4.8 9.2 22.5 4,883 16.2 0.8 25,315 83.8 4.0 5.0 79.6 
2011 51,197 7.7 13.1 35.0 6,859 13.4 1.0 44,338 86.6 6.7 6.7 111.3 
2012 55,604 8.1 13.4 34.9 7,368 13.3 1.1 48,236 86.7 7.0 7.4 111.6 
2013 41,600 5.8 10.2 25.1 6,330 15.2 0.9 35,270 84.8 4.9 6.6 108.6 
Sources: Author’s calculation from Input-Output tables, and the International Energy Agency 
website for oil prices. 
5. Results and comments 
Morocco imports all its energy products from which the major share is 
crude oil. The country is supplied by its refinery SAMIR
3
 with a refining capacity 
of 150,000 barrel/day and a storage capacity of 2 million m
3
. Therefore, 
international prices are directly reflected in the cost of production before tax and 
subsidies. 
                                                            
3 ttp://www.samir.ma/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=2&Itemid=104 
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We consider three scenarios for the rise of oil prices from their observed 
levels as baseline scenarios by respectively 25%, 50% and 75%. Regarding the 
tendency asymmetry found in most of the empirical literature
4
, we also consider 
three symmetric scenarios for the decreasing of oil prices by the same percentages 
(-25%, -50% and -75%) to check for this asymmetry. Assuming that removing 
subsidies is equivalent, in an oil importing country, to exposing the domestic 
producers and consumers of energy to direct impact of international prices, we 
translate the six previous scenarios of oil changes as changes in refined oil sector's 
inputs to the other sectors (sector 9, table 1). The assessment is therefore 
increasing/decreasing the intermediary consumption of oil sector used by other 
sectors and applying the input output price model formulae to study the impacts.  
Assuming that the input-output tables’ structure linkages could change 
over time leading to instable coefficients and multipliers, we choose to assess the 
scenarios effects considering three input-output matrices: the first of the period 
(1998), the middle (2005) and the last of the period (2012). The properties of the 
chosen matrices correspond to three different levels of actual recorded oil prices: 
low level in 1998 (12.8 US$ per barrel), medium level in 2005 (54.6 US$ per 
barrel) and high level in 2012 (111.6 US$ per barrel). This allows diversifying 
scenarios results under different actual prices. 
                                                            
4 See for example (Borenstein et al. 1997) and (Ladislav and Petra, 2015) for a survey of the 
articles on the asymmetry subject. 
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Table 3 presents the results for the studied scenarios for the three matrices. 
The first results show that in the absence of subsidies, international oil prices 
affect the most intensive sectors in oil products such as transportation services, 
electricity and water production, industries such as food processing, 
manufacturing and mining sectors. For example, transport prices have increased 
by around 10% in 1998 and 22% in 2005 and 2012 following a scenario of an 
increase in oil prices by 75%. 
 We detect also that in the symmetric scenarios (decreases), the magnitude 
of prices change is not significantly different from that of a symmetric increase. 
The difference in the two symmetric scenarios could attain 4.6 percentage points 
(22.3%-17.7%) in 2005, for 75% oil price change, recorded in the most inflated 
sector (transports). These differences, are however, not consistent to assume 
asymmetrical effects of the oil prices over the economy. The downward trend of 
the decreases effects compared to increases effects could be due to the resistance 
of some sectors to reduce prices and to imperfect competition in the economy. For 
example, in the common transport sector, the increase of oil prices is 
automatically and easily passed to the final consumer while the decrease faces 
resistance by public transporters like busses companies and individual taxies and 
needs severe control from the authorities.   
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We also show that, the effects are more pronounced in recent economic 
structure (2005 and 2012) than in fifteen years ago (1998). This could be a mixed 
effect of low level of actual oil prices in 1998, as well as the difference of 
structures of the productions (weights of sectors in term of total inputs use and 
intensiveness of energy use). Furthermore, observed linear movements of effects 
between the three scenarios are automatic due to the linear form of the input-
output models. 
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Table 3: Scenarios effects of refined oil price increases by respectively 25%, 50% and 75% (respectively decreases by -
25%, -50% and -75%) on the structure of production inputs in 1998, 2005 and 2012. 
  Effects on the structure of 1998 (%) Effects on the structure of 2005 (%) Effects on the structure of 2012 (%) 
  Increases by (%) Decreases by (%) Increases by (%) Decreases by (%) Increases by (%) Decreases by (%) 
Rank Economic sectors 25 50 75 -25 -50 -75 25 50 75 -25 -50 -75 25 50 75 -25 -50 -75 
1 Agriculture, hunting, and related services 0.6 1.2 1.8 -0.6 -1.1 -1.6 1.2 2.5 4.0 -1.1 -2.2 -3.1 0.8 1.5 2.3 -0.7 -1.4 -2.1 
2 Fishing and aquaculture 3.0 6.1 9.3 -2.9 -5.7 -8.4 4.0 8.2 12.9 -3.7 -7.0 -10.2 3.4 7.0 10.6 -3.3 -6.5 -9.6 
3 Mining Industry 2.3 4.6 7.1 -2.2 -4.3 -6.4 4.4 9.1 14.3 -4.0 -7.8 -11.3 1.7 3.5 5.4 -1.7 -3.3 -4.9 
4 Food Industry and Tobacco 1.1 2.2 3.3 -1.0 -2.1 -3.0 2.0 4.2 6.5 -1.9 -3.6 -5.2 1.6 3.2 4.9 -1.5 -3.0 -4.4 
5 Textile industry and cook 0.9 1.8 2.8 -0.9 -1.7 -2.5 1.7 3.4 5.4 -1.5 -2.9 -4.3 1.6 3.2 4.9 -1.5 -3.0 -4.4 
6 Chemical industry and para 1.4 2.9 4.5 -1.4 -2.7 -4.0 2.6 5.3 8.4 -2.4 -4.6 -6.6 1.3 2.7 4.1 -1.3 -2.5 -3.7 
7 Mechanical, electric and metal industries 1.2 2.4 3.6 -1.1 -2.2 -3.3 2.1 4.4 6.8 -1.9 -3.7 -5.4 1.9 3.9 5.9 -1.8 -3.6 -5.4 
8 Other manufacturing industries 2.8 5.7 8.7 -2.7 -5.3 -7.9 4.9 10.3 16.1 -4.6 -8.8 -12.7 4.8 9.9 15.0 -4.7 -9.2 -13.6 
9 Oil refining and others 1.7 3.4 5.3 -1.6 -3.2 -4.8 4.0 8.4 13.2 -3.7 -7.2 -10.4 1.7 3.5 5.3 -1.6 -3.2 -4.8 
10 Electricity and water 2.6 5.4 8.2 -2.5 -5.0 -7.4 3.4 7.0 11.0 -3.1 -6.0 -8.7 2.9 5.9 9.1 -2.8 -5.6 -8.2 
11 Building and public works 2.0 4.1 6.3 -2.0 -3.8 -5.7 2.9 5.9 9.3 -2.6 -5.1 -7.4 2.8 5.7 8.7 -2.7 -5.4 -7.9 
12 Trade and repairing 1.1 2.2 3.3 -1.0 -2.0 -3.0 2.0 4.2 6.6 -1.9 -3.6 -5.3 1.9 4.0 6.0 -1.9 -3.7 -5.5 
13 Hotels and restaurants 0.6 1.3 2.0 -0.6 -1.2 -1.8 1.0 2.1 3.3 -0.9 -1.8 -2.6 0.8 1.6 2.5 -0.8 -1.5 -2.3 
14 Transportation 3.3 6.8 10.4 -3.2 -6.3 -9.4 6.8 14.3 22.3 -6.3 -12.2 -17.7 7.1 14.4 22.0 -6.8 -13.5 -19.9 
15 Post and telecommunications 0.2 0.5 0.7 -0.2 -0.4 -0.6 0.9 1.9 3.0 -0.9 -1.6 -2.4 1.1 2.3 3.5 -1.1 -2.2 -3.2 
16 Financial activities and insurance 0.1 0.3 0.4 -0.1 -0.3 -0.4 0.2 0.4 0.7 -0.2 -0.4 -0.5 0.2 0.5 0.7 -0.2 -0.4 -0.6 
17 Real estate, rental and services to enterprises 0.1 0.2 0.3 -0.1 -0.2 -0.3 0.2 0.4 0.6 -0.2 -0.3 -0.5 0.1 0.3 0.4 -0.1 -0.2 -0.4 
18 General public administration and security 1.4 2.9 4.5 -1.4 -2.8 -4.1 1.6 3.3 5.2 -1.5 -2.8 -4.1 1.4 2.9 4.4 -1.4 -2.7 -4.0 
19 Education, health and social work 0.2 0.4 0.6 -0.2 -0.4 -0.5 0.2 0.4 0.7 -0.2 -0.4 -0.5 0.1 0.3 0.4 -0.1 -0.3 -0.4 
20 Other non financial services 0.3 0.7 1.0 -0.3 -0.6 -0.9 0.4 0.9 1.5 -0.4 -0.8 -1.2 0.4 0.8 1.2 -0.4 -0.7 -1.1 
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In the previous results, we count for oil refining sector as endogenous. 
However, it is more suitable to consider oil swings as foreign shocks for an oil 
importing country. We, therefore consider the oil sector exogenous, following the 
approach of Hanson et al. (1993). 
Using this approach, we produce three scenarios of increase effects and, 
for the two matrices of 2005 and 2012. The prices changes are quite reduced 
compared to the situation where we considered the oil sector as endogenous (table 
3). To deduce the overall inflation, we account for the weight of each sector. The 
contribution of each sector to the overall cost inflation is its price change 
multiplied by the corresponding weight. The overall inflation is then a sum of the 
all sectors’ contributions; a weighted sum of the 19 sectors’ inflation rates 
excluding the oil sector as it is exogenous. The results, presented in table 4, are 
sorted from largest to smallest sector's change on the basis of 2012 results. For a 
scenario of 75% of oil price increase, the most inflated sectors are transportation 
by 19.6% (1% as contribution), other manufacturing industries by 13.4%, fishing 
and aquaculture by 9.5% and electricity and water by 8.1. Furthermore, weights, 
as for oil intensiveness, play an important role in contributing to the overall 
inflation. For example, in 2012, fishing and aquaculture sector which have the 
highest oil intensity of 49.1% is the least weighted sector by 0.8% (table 1) 
making its contribution to the overall inflation insignificant (0.1%). 
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Table 4: Prices change of the inputs production structures of 2005 and 2012, following exogenous shocks on the 
refined oil sector by respectively 25%, 50% and 75%. 
  Effects of oil price increase on 2005 inputs 
structure  
Effects of oil price increases on 2012 inputs 
structure    25 50 75 Weighti 
% 
25 50 75 25 50 75ii Weighti 
% 
25 50 75 
 Economic sectors Scenarios effects 
(%) 
Weighted effects 
(%) 
Scenarios effects 
(%) 
Weighted effects 
(%) 14 Transportation 5.7 11.
4 
17.1 2.4 0.1 0.3 0.4 6.5 13.
1 
19.6 4.9 0.3 0.6 1 
8 Other manufacturing industries 4.1 8.2 12.3 11.1 0.5 0.9 1.4 4.5 8.9 13.4 3.8 0.2 0.3 0.5 
2 Fishing and aquaculture 3.3 6.6 9.9 1 0 0.1 0.1 3.2 6.3 9.5 0.8 0 0.1 0.1 
10 Electricity and water 2.8 5.6 8.4 3.5 0.1 0.2 0.3 2.7 5.4 8.1 2.4 0.1 0.1 0.2 
11 Building and public works 2.4 4.7 7.1 0.3 0 0 0 2.6 5.2 7.8 9.4 0.2 0.5 0.7 
12 Trade and repairing 1.7 3.4 5.1 1 0 0 0.1 1.8 3.6 5.4 8.4 0.2 0.3 0.5 
7 Mecanical, electric and metalurgical 
industries 
1.7 3.5 5.2 14.8 0.3 0.5 0.8 1.8 3.5 5.3 5.5 0.1 0.2 0.3 
3 Mining Industry 3.6 7.3 10.9 9.8 0.4 0.7 1.1 1.6 3.2 4.8 3.7 0.1 0.1 0.2 
4 Food Industry and Tobacco 1.7 3.3 5 7 0.1 0.2 0.4 1.5 2.9 4.4 10.1 0.1 0.3 0.4 
5 Textile industry and cook 1.4 2.7 4.1 6.6 0.1 0.2 0.3 1.4 2.9 4.3 3.8 0.1 0.1 0.2 
18 General public administration and 
security 
1.3 2.7 4 0 0 0 0 1.3 2.6 3.9 7.9 0.1 0.2 0.3 
6 Chemical industry and para 2.1 4.3 6.4 6.4 0.1 0.3 0.4 1.2 2.4 3.6 3.9 0 0.1 0.1 
15 Post and telecommunications 0.8 1.5 2.3 1.2 0 0 0 1 2.1 3.1 2.5 0 0.1 0.1 
13 Hotels and restaurants 0.8 1.7 2.5 1 0 0 0 0.7 1.5 2.2 2.4 0 0 0.1 
1 Agriculture, hunting, and related 
services 
1 2 3 16.2 0.2 0.3 0.5 0.7 1.4 2.1 10.2 0.1 0.1 0.2 
20 Other non financial services 0.4 0.7 1.1 0.5 0 0 0 0.3 0.7 1 1 0 0 0 
16 Financial activities and insurance 0.2 0.3 0.5 8.9 0 0 0 0.2 0.4 0.6 4.7 0 0 0 
19 Education, health and social work 0.2 0.3 0.5 0.1 0 0 0 0.1 0.3 0.4 6.5 0 0 0 
17 Real estate, rental and services to 
enterprises 
0.2 0.3 0.5 8.2 0 0 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 8 0 0 0 
 Total Weighted Inflation (oil sector 
exogenous)  
   100.0 1.9 3.8 5.7    100.0 1.6 3.3 4.9 
 Total Weighted Inflation (oil sector 
endogenous) 
    2.4 5.1 8.0     1.8 3.6 5.5 
i: Weights in table 4 are a little different from those presented for 2005 and 2012 in table 1, as they are newly calculated to adjust for only 19 
sectors after the withdrawal of oil sector considered as exogenous in this table. 
ii: All the data in the table are sorted from largest to smallest according to the column reporting the effects of oil price increase by 75%. 
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6. Conclusion and policy discussion 
In September 2014, oil prices have started to decline from their high levels 
above 100 US$ and reached the level of 50 US$ at the beginning of the year 2015. 
This constitutes a huge decrease of more than 50% in just a quarter of year. 
Despite the uncertainty surrounding the oil prices outlook in general, the recorded 
low level of oil prices is expected by many specialists to last in 2015 before 
starting to shift upward with a high probability that initial levels could not be 
regained in the medium term. The decrease is a consequence of supply and 
demand shocks. Form a supply side, United States production capacities 
augmented. From a demand side, world growth is expected to slow in 2015. The 
recent oil prices downward trend coincides with the total removal of subsidies 
over gasoline and diesel products in Morocco. This avoided to the economy, the 
inflationary pressures that could have occurred had the oil prices continued with 
their high levels of 2013. 
Encouraged by the World Bank and the IMF, the energy reform in 
Morocco has passed a big step by liberalizing more than 80% of energy prices. 
Despite that the reform coincides with the descending trend of oil prices in late 
2014 and the beginning of 2015, it is expected that low oil prices may not last and 
may regain their high levels by the end of this year. Under theses expected 
circumstances, we simulated three gradual scenarios of 25%, 50% and 75% 
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increases in international oil prices taking into account the recent production 
structures of the economy in 2005 and 2012. We showed that this could generate 
an overall additional cost inflation of respectively, 1.8% to 2.4% for the first 
scenario, 3.6% to 5.1% for the second and 5.5% to 8% for the last scenario. This 
inflation is mainly dragged by leading sectors intensive in oil products such as 
transports, electricity and water production and food processing and 
manufacturing industries. 
We also show that the asymmetry effects are not strongly pronounced in 
our results in conformity with the majority of the studies in the literature of oil 
prices effects (Kristoufek and Lunackova, 2015); despite quite reduced effects 
when prices are downward compared to upward trend. We also use different input 
output matrices of years where actual oil prices are low (1998), medium (2005) 
and very high (2012) and sectors inputs weights are also variable. This allows 
assessing the effects assuming the inputs coefficients instability. The results show 
substantial differences between the three matrices especially between 1998 matrix 
and the two others. 
By the expected back of oil prices increase, inflationary pressures will 
arise which could threaten the “great moderation era” of Morocco. Indeed, the 
country has enjoyed low stable inflation rates over the period 1996-2014. The 
average inflation rate over this period is 1.7% bounded with a minimum of 0.6% 
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in 2001 and a maximum of 3.9% recorded in 2008. It is the best stable inflation 
path in the MENA region in terms of average and variability (table 5). The 
important questions that remain are: what has to be done, henceforth, to cushion 
the inflationary effects? Does the Central Bank in its current status armed to 
control such additional cost inflation? 
Table 5: Inflation rates distribution over the period 1996-2014 for the Middle East 
and North African Countries. 
  Mean STDEV Minimum Maximum Range 
Morocco 1.73 0.97 0.61 3.89 3.28 
Tunisia 3.67 1.24 1.44 6.11 4.66 
Kuwait 2.92 1.73 0.60 6.30 5.70 
Bahrain 1.51 1.84 -1.26 4.60 5.86 
Saudi Arabia 1.61 2.35 -2.08 6.10 8.18 
Mauritania 5.70 2.49 2.14 12.13 9.99 
Djibouti 3.20 2.51 -0.40 11.96 12.36 
Jordan 3.83 3.14 -0.67 13.94 14.62 
Oman 2.16 3.15 -1.20 12.56 13.76 
Lebanon 3.74 3.34 -0.72 10.76 11.48 
United Arab Emirates 3.76 3.50 0.67 12.25 11.59 
Algeria 4.62 3.90 0.30 18.70 18.40 
Pakistan 8.34 3.90 2.43 17.63 15.20 
Egypt 7.32 4.09 0.00 16.24 16.24 
Syria 4.00 5.18 -3.90 15.15 19.05 
Qatar 4.20 5.21 -4.95 15.20 20.15 
Libya 2.45 5.84 -9.86 15.90 25.77 
Islamic Republic of Iran 18.17 6.67 10.35 34.70 24.35 
Yemen 12.27 7.46 3.68 38.79 35.11 
Afghanistan 10.06 9.16 -6.81 26.42 33.23 
Iraq 14.22 18.97 -2.19 53.25 55.44 
Sudan 23.18 29.35 4.87 132.82 127.95 
Source: Calculated from, IMF World Economic Outlook Database, October 2014. 
Data are sorted from smallest Standard deviation to largest (column 3) 
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Generally, some believe that the great moderation era is not due only to 
the success and achievements of the Central Banks; it is rather import prices and 
wages moderation (Perry and Cline, 2013). In Morocco, this performance is seen 
by some as a forced stability at the expense of sustainable growth and full 
employment promotion (Taouil, 2010). The monetary policy and the fiscal policy 
altogether have contributed to insufficient growth and low level of employment 
achievements. This sounds more arguable if we look at some monetary 
aggregates, such as, the public debt composition trend which is characterized over 
the period 1998-2010 by a growing share of debt acquired from the domestic 
market and a decreasing share of the public foreign debt (graph 1). This gives a 
signal of a constriction of the credit market by the Government.  
Graph 1: The evolution of treasury debt in Morocco, as percent of GDP. 
 
Source:  The Ministry of Economy and Finance, Morocco. 
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The fiscal policy plays also an important role by subsidies, as proven in 
this paper, in cushioning the effects of high prices of imported energy and food 
products. Moreover, the real lending rate, the real cost by which the private sector 
is financed from the banking sector, is the highest among the MENA region, 
despite an opposite low level of Central Bank policy rate compared to the MENA 
region (graph 2). This constitutes a brake on the demand and access to credit 
especially for SMEs, which impacts the growth and thus reduces inflation by 
demand shocks.  The classic response to the positive demand shocks that 
increases the inflation and output is tightening the monetary policy. However, for 
a foreign positive price shock, the implications are only inflationary and their 
effects are negative on output making the task not straightforward for the Central 
Bank (De Gregorio, 2012). 
Graph 2: Average nominal and real lending rates over the period 2001-2013 for 
selected MENA countries (%) 
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Source: World Development Indicators database, the World Bank. 
 
The important results of this paper are that the fiscal policy, by the 
presence of subsidies, among other factors of its action, plays a major role in 
bringing down inflation. We show that canceling energy subsidies constitutes an 
additional inflation that should be put under control by the monetary authorities. 
The Central Bank of Morocco should adopt a more flexible framework to cushion 
the foreign inflationary shocks. The reform of subsidies should accelerate the 
current debate about the Moroccan exchange rate regime and the inflation 
targeting regime. We join the views of many experts to emphasize recommending 
targeting domestic prices and free the exchange rate as reforms accelerate and the 
economy become more financially integrated. The current depreciation of the 
euro versus the dollar to its lowest level for more than 10 years ago, push towards 
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such reform; keeping the current pegged exchange rate to the basket of Euro and 
Dollar by respectively 80% and 20%, will depreciate the dirham against the dollar 
leading to an increase in the debt level and the import bill. 
Finally, by succeeding to control the inflation, the overall economy will 
benefit from the reform of energy subsidies. Besides the reduction of the twin 
deficits (budget and current account deficits) and the positive effects of their 
macroeconomic implications, removing price subsidies is expected to serve the 
assumed principal social goal of their creation at the beginning; that is, among 
others, protecting the population from high prices. The saved budget from the 
reform should be targeted towards social investments and fragile population to 
reduce poverty and inequality. Furthermore, structural transformation in the 
economy could happen and resources will shift from capital intensive sectors to 
labor intensive sectors leading to reduced unemployment rate.  
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